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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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TRENDS

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
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 24 - 30 JULY 1972

Moscow (2965 items)

Vietnam	(11%)	12%
[U.S. Air Strikes	(3%)	5%]
[Conference of	(--)	4%]
European Communist		
& Workers Parties		
Cuba 26 July	(--)	8%
Anniversary		
Syrian CP-CPSU Talks	(--)	3%
in Moscow		
CEMA Session	(6%)	3%
China	(3%)	2%
Middle East	(0.5%)	2%

Peking (1465 items)

Domestic Issues	(32%)	29%
Indochina	(17%)	19%
[Sihanouk Tour	(5%)	8%]
[U.S. Air Strikes	(1%)	5%]
Withdrawal of Soviet	(3%)	7%
Advisers from Egypt		
Yemeni (Aden) Government	(6%)	5%
Delegation in PRC, DPRK		
UN Committee Discussions	(--)	4%
on Seabeds		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi media have described President Nixon's 27 July press conference as an unsuccessful attempt to counter widespread condemnation of alleged U.S. bombings of North Vietnamese dams and dikes. The State Department report released on the 28th, citing photographic evidence that there has been no intentional U.S. bombing of the dikes, has been noted only in a Hanoi broadcast on the 29th which dismissed it as a further effort to assuage public opinion. Continued denunciations of U.S. actions included DRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap's remark, at an embassy reception on 31 July on the eve of Chinese army day, that the United States is "ruthlessly bombing and shelling many heavily populated areas . . . and deliberately destroying dikes and irrigation works."

In addition to continuing, virtually daily protests over the strikes by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman, a higher-level foreign ministry statement on the 31st denounced recent bombing of Haiphong. And on the 28th Hanoi released a lengthy DRV Foreign Ministry memorandum in connection with the four-month U.S. "war escalation" against the North.

DRV comment on the President's press conference ignored his remarks on a political settlement and his assertion that the chance for successful negotiations is now better than it has ever been. Hanoi has not commented on the Paris talks, but the VNA account of the 27 July session duly noted that the communist delegates again argued for a simultaneous military and political settlement. The account also reported that DRV delegate Xuan Thuy had asked why the United States is now pressing the President's 8 May call for an immediate cease-fire when it had previously agreed that a cease-fire should come after both military and political problems are settled.

Sihanouk's return to Peking from an extensive trip occasioned a pro forma reaffirmation of Chinese support for the war effort in Indochina, but Peking's comment on a settlement has been couched in generalities. The Indochina conflict received only a passing mention in celebrations of the PLA anniversary this year.

DRV RIDICULES PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, INSISTS DIKES BEING BOMBED

Hanoi has reacted only with routine radio and press comment to President Nixon's 27 July press conference in which he reaffirmed

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that U.S. air strikes in North Vietnam are not aimed at dikes or other targets where heavy civilian casualties would be likely. The DRV press spokesman at the Paris talks issued the usual prompt statement--which charged that the President had "once more advanced sophistic arguments"--but it was not carried in Hanoi media until the 29th. The first monitored reaction was a Hanoi radio broadcast on the 28th which stated that the President had to convene a "surprise" press conference in the face of continued denunciations of the alleged bombing of dams and dikes. It said he "admitted" that a number of North Vietnamese dikes had been hit but tried to argue that they were "insignificant and hit accidentally." On the 29th Hanoi broadcast comment from the party paper NHAN DAN and the army daily QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, but there has been no NHAN DAN Commentator article--a vehicle used to react to most of the President's past press conferences and other pronouncements.*

Statements by two DRV officials regarding alleged U.S. strikes at dikes and DRV maintenance of the dikes did not mention the President's press conference but seemed to have been publicized to counter it as well as other U.S. pronouncements. These DRV statements took the form of an article by the head of the "Central Anti-Flood and Anti-Typhoon Command Committee," broadcast by Hanoi on the 28th, and a press conference held in Hanoi on the 29th by a vice minister of the Water Conservancy Ministry, reported by Hanoi radio on the same day.

The commentaries on the press conference cited the President's remarks selectively, glossing over such details as his statement that if damage to the dikes did occur, every effort is being made to see that it will not occur again. Instead they characterized his remarks as an "admission" of his "crimes" of intentionally attacking the dikes, and they claimed that he

* Most recently, a NHAN DAN Commentator article was prompted by the President's 29 June press conference at which he announced that the Paris talks would be resumed on 13 July and reiterated his intention to continue the air strikes and mining of DRV ports in the absence of a response to his 8 May proposals. Commentator articles in NHAN DAN have not been issued on all of the President's press conferences, however. For example, those of 29 April and 1 June 1971 occasioned only lower-level comment. Atypically, Hanoi completely ignored the 4 August 1971 press conference in which the President spoke about his planned trip to China as well as about Vietnamese issues.

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personally admitted the damage. They were particularly scornful of his references to civilian casualties in the South caused by the communists. For example, a Hanoi radio broadcast on the 28th called this "brazen allegation" a smokescreen for the U.S. "genocidal, biocidal, and ecocidal crimes." The commentary was notably abusive toward the President, calling him a "criminal and a liar" and a "carnivorous wild beast." It accused him of crimes more barbarous than those of the Hitlerites and "greater than the crimes of dropping the atomic bomb."

The Hanoi press comment was also personally abusive, with the NHAN DAN article on the 29th observing that the President "brazenly spoke of the U.S. imperialists' ability to cause big floods and to ravage Vietnamese territory"--apparent allusions to his remarks that if it were U.S. policy to bomb the dikes they could be taken out in a week, and that the United States is not using and will not use the great power that could finish off North Vietnam in an afternoon. NHAN DAN went on to say: "What is clear is that Nixon has gone mad and lost his reason, because on the one hand world opinion has driven him into a corner and on the other hand, what is more important, despite all his moves, he has failed to save the Saigon puppet clique." A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the 29th said that "the Nixon clique's scheme" is to deliberately cause floods in the coming rainy season in order to bring large-scale destruction to the populous delta area and "to create difficulties and lower our people's will to resist." It concluded that "once again Nixon has exposed his deliberate intent to commit crimes as did Hitler, a war criminal cursed by all of mankind."

Much of the comment repeated Hanoi's statistics on the alleged damage to dikes and water conservation projects since April. A Hanoi radio commentary on the 28th cited Water Conservancy Ministry figures to support its contention that the dikes hit were indeed major ones. It also noted statements by foreign visitors, including "newsmen, artists, diplomats, and religious people." The only acknowledgment of the State Department report on dikes came in a Hanoi radio broadcast on the 29th. Citing AP, it noted that the study acknowledged a dozen strikes on dikes but said the damage had been minor. Without elaboration, it added that the report "advanced scores of reasons to prove that the United States had not deliberately struck at these dikes and dams and that if any had been hit, the damage was minor."

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While the account of the 29 July press conference held by Vice Minister of the DRV Water Conservancy Ministry Phan My made no mention of President Nixon's press conference, the timing suggests that the purpose was in part to counter U.S. statements that any bombing of dikes was inadvertent. None of the comment pegged to the President's press conference acknowledged his remarks on North Vietnamese laxity in repairing and maintaining the dikes in view of the serious 1971 floods. But Phan My made a point of reiterating details about maintenance work in recent months. He also declared that "during the flood in 1971, which was the biggest in a hundred years, all the dikes belonging to the Red River system were well maintained. Damage was limited to a number of districts belonging to the Thai Binh River system."* A detailing of alleged U.S. damage to the dikes as well as DRV maintenance of them appeared in the 28 July broadcast of an article by Ha Kc Tan, head of the Central Anti-Flood and Anti-Typhoon Command Committee. He said that "our dikes are very firm, are big and high enough, are consistent with technical standards, and are capable of withholding the flash flood water level reached in 1971." He concluded that if dikes in North Vietnam break this summer, "Nixon must bear responsibility for the genocide."

REPORTS OF Hanoi media during the past week reported
RECENT STRIKES several new instances of alleged U.S. strikes
at the DRV's water conservancy and irrigation
systems. Hanoi radio on the 31st claimed damage on 29 July to a
portion of the Chu River dike and to the Ngoc Quang sluice, both
in Thanh Hoa Province, describing the latter as a major drainage
sluice and the raids as "intentional" and carried out in "a careful
and premeditated manner." It also reported the destruction of the
Lan water lock in Thai Binh Province on the 29th; VNA, in
detailing the destruction of this "important" project in a report
on the 31st, stressed that it was remote from "any highway storage
or anything else that could be allied to a 'military target'" and
charged that it was hit by "teleguided air-to-ground missiles"
and bombs. One other target reported hit on the 29th was a
section of the Phong Chu dike in Tho Xuan district of Thanh Hoa
Province; this action was among those cited in a foreign ministry
spokesman's statement of the 30th.

* The State Department report said, among other things, that the floods of last August rank with the most serious ever recorded. Four major breaches occurred in the primary dikes along the Red River.

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Radio reports this week also mentioned earlier alleged strikes not previously reported: on the Tra Ly River dike, Thai Binh Province, on 21 July, and on portions of dikes and other hydraulic works along the La River in Ha Tinh Province on 25 July. Charges of deliberate attacks on civilians repairing dikes in Ha Tinh Province were leveled in the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of 1 August.

U.S. STRIKES PROTESTED BY DRV FOREIGN, EDUCATION MINISTRIES

DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY
"MEMORANDUM"

In addition to the continuing official DRV protests over current U.S. air strikes, VNA on 28 July transmitted the text of a lengthy memorandum from the press and information department of the foreign ministry entitled "New U.S. War Escalation Against the DRV." The memorandum, which was released at a Hanoi press conference, was divided into four sections: 1) The Character of the Nixon Administration's New war Escalation Move, 2) Why the New War Escalation, 3) Escalation Cannot Stave Off Defeat, and 4) The Correct Way to a Settlement of the Vietnam Problem. The memorandum rounds up the air strikes since the step-up at the beginning of April. There was no explanation in the propaganda regarding the release now, but it may have been timed with the anniversary of the Geneva agreements in mind. In a departure from practice for the past several years, Hanoi this year issued no foreign ministry document on the anniversary.

The substance and form of the current memorandum is similar to one issued by the press department of the foreign ministry on 22 July 1966. That one detailed the "new criminal U.S. steps in the escalation of the war in the North from 31 January to 15 July 1966," after a bombing pause. On 10 July 1965, on the occasion of the 20 July 1954 Geneva agreements anniversary, the same department had issued a white book on U.S. "intervention and aggression in Vietnam during the last 20 years." Like the current memorandum, the white book included a section on political settlement.

The section on political settlement in the current memorandum included the standard demand for an immediate end to the bombing and mining of DRV ports, as well as an end to the Vietnamization policy and all U.S. involvement in South Vietnam. It called for an end to U.S. support for the Thieu regime, the removal of its

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machinery of "oppression and coercion," and the establishment of the three-segment government of national concord to organize elections. It declared that that is the spirit of the PRG's seven-point solution, "the two key points of which--total withdrawal and political power in South Vietnam--have been elaborated." It also assailed the President's contention that the communists want to impose a government on the South and countered that "his generous terms" in fact boil down to maintaining the Saigon administration and demanding that the PLAF lay down its arms.

FOREIGN MINISTRY
STATEMENT

On 31 July the DRV Foreign Ministry issued its second ministerial-level protest in as many weeks, in response to U.S. strikes of 26-30 July on Haiphong city and harbor. This is in keeping with Hanoi's general policy of reacting to strikes at the two major cities of Hanoi and Haiphong with high-level statements. Describing the intensive attacks on the city as "extermination bombings and shellings," the statement charged that residential areas, hospitals, and factories within the city were hit, as well as densely populated areas surrounding it, and that many innocent civilians were killed or wounded. It charged that such "extermination attacks" on Haiphong and other cities "lay bare the shameful denials of the Americans," who are concocting schemes to "systematically" bomb and shell cities and other populated areas, as well as "dikes, dams, and irrigation systems."

In appealing for support from peoples and government of the world in the Vietnamese struggle, the statement included among them "various fraternal socialist countries"--a standard appeal that had been revived in the 22 July DRV Foreign Ministry statement after having been omitted from those of 26 June and 4 July.* (A 31 July and 1 August VNA report of U.S. air strikes on Haiphong on the 29th, 30th, and 31st said that many Chinese residents of various precincts within the city were killed in the "savage raids" of 31 July.)

The claims made in the Foreign Ministry's statement were repeated in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary of 2 August. As carried by VNA, it classed the reported destruction in Haiphong and other populated areas as "a genocidal crime of exceptional gravity" perpetrated by "the White House and Pentagon war criminals."

* See the TRENDS of 26 July 1972, pages 2-3.

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The commentary charged that the attacks on Haiphong and the alleged recent strikes at the dikes, occurring just a few days after the "Nixon clique" had "denied any bombing of civilian areas and dikes in North Vietnam," have revealed its true nature as "a gang of bloodthirsty killers who have lost all human character."

EDUCATION MINISTRY
SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENT

Claiming that "all education cadres and teachers and millions of students in the DRV" are determined to defeat the U.S. aggressors, a statement issued by the Education Ministry spokesman on 27 July condemned alleged U.S. strikes on schools in North Vietnam since April. As reported by Hanoi radio on 29 July, the statement tied such strikes in with those on "the dike system and water conservancy projects" as part of the "extremely barbarous crimes" ordered by the Nixon Administration against the Vietnamese people.

According to the statement, damage was suffered by schools in the provinces of Quang Binh, Ha Tinh, Nghe An, Thanh Hoa, Ninh Binh, Nam Ha, Thai Binh, Hai Hung, Ha Tay and Quang Ninh, and the cities of Hanoi, Haiphong, and Nam Dinh, and "several hundred" teachers and students were killed or injured. Several "typical cases" of destruction were cited, with emphasis on details of a personal or human-interest nature. The statement charged that the alleged U.S. attacks were "genocidal," since they are "aimed at annihilating the future generation of the Vietnamese people" and represent a deliberate attempt to kill not only students but the teachers who are "performing their duty of training the younger generations," as well as to destroy the cultural and educational establishments of the DRV.

FOREIGN MINISTRY
SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENTS

U.S. bombing, mining of the harbors, and "all other acts encroaching upon the sovereignty and security of the DRV" were protested in six routine Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements during the past week.

+ The statement of the 27th condemned alleged strikes at populated areas in the outskirts of Haiphong and in the provinces of Hai Hung, Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh and the Vinh Linh area, as well as bombardments of coastal areas in Quang Binh by U.S. warships.

+ In the statement of the 28th, the "round-the-clock" nature of U.S. bombing and strafing was said to have exposed the true

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nature of "U.S. imperialism" and its claim that "it only hits military targets." The statement denounced several strikes on the 27th against Vinh and the Haiphong suburbs, as well as on populated areas in Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh area. It also charged that U.S. warships attacked coastal areas in Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and that B-52's bombed localities in Quang Binh Province and the Vinh Linh area.

+ A brief statement of the 29th denounced the "barbarous war acts" of the previous day, when U.S. aircraft allegedly bombed and strafed many populated areas in Ha Bac, Hai Hung, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh area. Many economic and cultural establishments and private dwellings were reported hit and many innocent people killed or wounded.

+ Strikes on the dikes highlighted the statement of the 30th, which charged that these and other attacks represented deliberate massacring of civilians and destruction of dikes and dams, hydraulic works, and economic establishments serving the livelihood of the Vietnamese people. The dikes specifically mentioned were a section of the Phong Chu dike in Xuan Vinh village of Tho Xuan district, Thanh Hoa Province, and the Lan water lock in Tien Hai district of Thai Binh Province.

There were standard, more general denunciations of alleged strikes on the 30th at residential areas in the suburbs of Hanoi and nearby localities, as well as in Haiphong and its outskirts. Also condemned were the alleged bombing and strafing on the 29th of populated areas on the outskirts of Haiphong and in Lang Son, Ha Bac, Hai Hung, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh area. U.S. warships were charged with "wantonly" striking many localities in Quang Binh Province.

+ Citing the "extermination attacks" recently directed at Haiphong, the statement of 1 August charged that U.S. aircraft on 31 July bombed and strafed populated areas in Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and in the Vinh Linh area. It further charged that B-52's bombed localities in Quang Binh Province and that U.S. warships hit a number of coastal villages in Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces. In denouncing the

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destruction of "many cultural and economic establishments," it said the Americans "deliberately" attacked people who were repairing the dikes at Nghi Pho village, Nghi Xuan district, Ha Tinh Province."

+ The 2 August statement charged U.S. aircraft with "continued savage strikes" the preceding day on populated areas in Thai Binh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and on Cat Ba Island near Haiphong. It also claimed that U.S. warships shelled coastal villages in Xuan Thuy district of Nam Ha Province and Quang Xuong district in Thanh Hoa and that B-52's bombed several localities in Quang Binh Province. The attacks were said to have killed and wounded a number of civilians and to have destroyed many dwellings and economic and cultural installations.

CAPTURED PILOTS,
PLANE DOWNINGS

Hanoi radio and VNA on 1 August released what they called "data about some of the U.S. pilots captured recently." Captain James David Kula and Captain Melvin Kazuki Matsui were reported captured in Lang Son Province on 29 July, and Lt. Col. William John Breckner and Lt. Larry Donald Price were said to have been captured on the 30th after being shot down over Hanoi. The VNA press review of 2 August said that pictures of the four pilots appeared in papers of that date. At a 29 June Hanoi press conference, 16 U.S. pilots captured since the April intensification of the air strikes had been identified and 14 of them put on display. One pilot said to have been captured "recently" had been presented at a 17 April press conference. Pilots had also been presented at a press conference on 12 May, but all had been captured in February or earlier.*

Claimed plane downings as of 31 July reached a total of 3,794 with reported downings during the past week including one over Nghe An, one over Quang Binh, one over Lang Son, two over Thanh Hoa, two over Hanoi, and one over Haiphong.

The achievements of the DRV's local air defense forces continued to receive commendation as Hanoi radio on the 26th broadcast a letter from President Ton Duc Thang congratulating the people of Nghe An Province on downing their 500th plane** and exhorting them to continue to serve the frontline and to cooperate with the

* See the TRENDS of 6 July 1972, pages 8-9.

** Earlier propaganda on this feat is discussed in the TRENDS of 26 July 1972, pages 6-7.

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armed forces and people throughout the country in working toward total victory against "U.S. aggression." A similar presidential commendation on 11 July had hailed the alleged downing of the 300th plane over Hanoi.

Detailed descriptions of the operations of local units appeared in a 25 July Hanoi radio report on the "low-altitude firenet of the self-defense militia force" in Thanh Hoa Province, which was credited with the twin achievements of downing 300 planes over the province and 100 over the Ham Rong bridge area. Presenting recorded statements by the leaders of several of these units--including a young girl just out of school as well as a deputy village chief and a low-level political commissar--the report stressed their determination to win and their mastering of combat skills while they continue in production activities. It emphasized the constant vigilance required in the work of spotting planes and using infantry weapons either to down them directly or to force them higher where they become vulnerable to antiaircraft and artillery fire. The report concluded with comments by the provincial military commander stressing the great capability and promising future of the "low-altitude fire force" and the comprehensiveness of its deployment "in every self-defense militia cell and squad, in every labor unit of the cooperative, in every hamlet and village, in every work shift at the factory, in every organ and in every school, so that every place will become a battleground to resist enemy aircraft."

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HANOI, FRONT LAUD "VICTORIES" IN FOUR-MONTH-OLD OFFENSIVE

Vietnamese communist propaganda has continued to hail the "great victories" of the spring offensive and it ridicules Saigon reports on inroads made into areas captured by the communists. The offensive was predictably praised by DRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap in his speech at a 31 July reception marking the 45th anniversary of the PRC army day. Giap claimed that the offensive had "obtained resounding and all-sided victories on all battlefields" and made the "war situation more favorable . . . than ever before." And he asserted that the South Vietnam revolution "is now provided with favorable conditions to push forward its offensive and win complete victory."

Statistics on the communists' alleged military achievements since the start of the offensive on 30 March were publicized by LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY (LPA) in a 31 July report which claimed that 220,000 allied troops had been put out of action, 20,000 of them captured, including "hundreds" of U.S. and South Vietnamese officers. At the end of June the communists had claimed that 150,000 allied troops had been put out of action, thus 70,000 of these alleged losses were purportedly inflicted in the past month.* LPA's latest summation also claimed that 1,300 aircraft were downed or destroyed and that 5,400 military vehicles, including 1,800 tanks and armored cars, and 1,200 artillery pieces were seized or destroyed.

The failure of the communists to claim spectacular gains comparable to those in the first month of their offensive is apparent when the current summation of alleged achievements is compared with a similar summation at the beginning of May. LPA now says that "nearly half" the South Vietnamese infantry divisions have "sustained extremely heavy losses," but propaganda in early May had already claimed that "almost half" of the 13 ARVN regular divisions had been "annihilated or heavily decimated." The current figures on alleged allied losses of tanks and armored vehicles and artillery pieces are more than

* Propaganda at the end of June indicated that 60,000 troops had been put out of action in the previous two months; 90,000 were allegedly lost in April, the first month of the offensive. See the TRENDS of 6 July 1972, page 11, and 10 May 1972, page 20.

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double the figures claimed at the beginning of May.* But, perhaps reflecting the influx of materiel for Saigon forces since the start of the offensive, LPA again merely echoes claims made in May that "nearly half" of Saigon's tanks and armored cars and one-third of their artillery units were "wiped out."

LPA's release of the statistics on the offensive was followed by editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 1 August which, according to VNA, claim that the alleged feats are "stunning blows" to Vietnamization and have opened better prospects than ever before for the Vietnamese people's struggle. Both papers reiterated the claim that the offensive has resulted in a favorable shift in the balance of forces. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN said that the offensive is "continuing to develop strongly," and it reviewed action throughout the South to demonstrate that attempted allied counterattacks have failed.

QUANG TRI Hanoi and Front comment on the fighting in Quang Tri ridicules reports of allied military advances. The 25 July Saigon announcement that its airborne troops had entered the Quang Tri citadel that day was denigrated in a barrage of comment beginning on the 27th. On that day, a NHAN DAN article dismissed the claim as a "psywar trick," citing as evidence military reports from the Quang Tri PLAF command that the citadel remained under the control of liberation forces through the afternoon of the 26th and that no Saigon soldier had broken in. In line with earlier comment on the Saigon counteroffensive, NHAN DAN maintained that the recapture of the citadel was "fabricated" to shore up the morale of Saigon troops and cited a Western journalist as observing that "the recapture of Quang Tri city is Thieu's number one political objective that would at least permit the U.S. and Saigon representatives returning to the Paris talks to hold their heads high even if they are not in a position of strength." An article in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 27th, similarly ridiculing the claimed entrance into the citadel, went on to claim that "Western public opinion" has criticized the allies for entering an area of strong communist fortifications, adding that "the puppet airborne troops have allowed themselves to fall into the communists' trap and have been seriously routed."

* A 6 May PLAF command communique claimed that in the first month of the offensive 750 tanks and armored cars and 460 cannon were destroyed or captured.

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On the 28th, another QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article cited the announcement the previous day that the marines were replacing airborne units in Quang Tri city as evidence of the failure of allied efforts in the city. This same point was made in a 28 July Liberation Radio commentary, attributed to "Nguoi Ban Tai" (the sniper), which commented that "the puppet paratroopers and marines--who have been pushed into the Quang Tri trap--are crawling about in a very awkward situation because they are being resolutely intercepted and attacked both in front and at the rear." QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commented again on the fighting in Quang Tri in an article on the 30th which also took note of fighting in Thua Thien Province including the action at Fire Base Bastogne (designated Dong Tranh by the communists) which was evacuated by the ARVN on 26 July. On the 31st the army paper published details on the defense of the Quang Tri citadel, including a description of the alleged destruction of a squad of soldiers "sneaking" toward the citadel with a flag.

On 30 July, for the third time in a month, allied bombing and shelling in support of the GVN counteroffensive in Quang Tri was protested by the PRG Foreign Ministry. The statement charged that the United States attempted to destroy the citadel in Quang Tri city with attacks by "hundreds of tactical planes of various types and dozens of warships." Like earlier foreign ministry statements on 11 and 18 July, it warned that "the PRG is resolved to take all necessary military and political measures to punish the U.S. aggressors for their criminal war acts."*

BINH DINH Although propagandists have been less forthcoming about the counteroffensive by Saigon forces in Binh Dinh Province, the 1 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial lauding the communist offensive did claim that in Bong Son and Tam Quang in Binh Dinh Province, the ARVN were beaten "as soon as they made an attempt to recover lost territories." A 30 July LPA report claimed that from 10 to 27 July the PLAF and people in Binh Dinh had "mounted repeated attacks on enemy troops engaged in nibbling attacks against the liberated areas north of Phu My district, south and north of Bong Son bridge and De Duc area, Hoai Nhon district." According to LPA, over 1,100 troops were wiped out and captured and, "in face of the PLAF's violent attacks, the garrisons in Bong Son had to flee."

* For a discussion of the previous statements, see the TRENDS of 12 July 1972, pages 11-12, and 19 July 1972, pages 16-17.

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On the 29th and 30th Hanoi and Front media publicized statistics on alleged achievements from 8 April to 20 July in central Trung Bo--the central South Vietnamese provinces including Binh Dinh. They claimed that some 79,500 soldiers were wiped out and captured during this 100-day period. A 30 July QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial hailing these achievements observed that the allies, "in their perilous situation," have "frenziedly counterattacked by mobilizing their aircraft and launching disorganized counterattacks with a view to recapturing a number of towns." Predicting that further counterattacks would result in more serious setbacks, the editorial claimed that "recently many puppet battalions were annihilated in Binh Dinh, Quang Nam, and Kontum." It cited reports by U.S. and Western news agencies for the conclusion that the communists control almost all of Quang Ngai Province, the greater part of Binh Dinh Province, and almost all of Kontum Province.

MEKONG DELTA, Alleged achievements in the first 100 days of
SAIGON AREA the offensive in the Mekong Delta area were
 lauded by Hanoi and Front media on 25 and
26 July. The communists claimed that during the period from
7 April to 17 July their forces put out of action almost
57,000 troops, overran or forced the surrender or evacuation
of 600 posts and positions, "liberated" nearly 1,100 more
villages and hamlets, and enabled an additional one million
people to "regain control." It was also claimed that 130
aircraft, 150 military vehicles, and 110 artillery pieces were
destroyed. A 26 July QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on these
alleged feats claimed that the "newly liberated areas" have
made "substantial human and material resources" available with
which to develop forces and "establish very advantageous
offensive springboards."

The specter of further attacks in the delta and in provinces around Saigon was raised in a series of articles broadcast by Liberation Radio on 31 July and 1 August and attributed to Nguyen Ngoc. Ngoc declared that the liberated areas had been greatly expanded in this area and that the allies could not check "the big leap forward in the guerrilla war." He claimed that the offensive had provided a good opportunity for the liberation forces in areas near Saigon to stage offensives and uprisings, specifically maintaining, for example, that "offensive springboards" in northern Gia Dinh "are being expanded to the outskirts of Saigon in order to advance toward besieging the enemy there." After reviewing the situation in other provinces around the capital, Ngoc concluded that "it is

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clear that the encirclement by guerrilla warfare has been gradually tightened and is increasing its threat against the U.S.-puppets' biggest lair in Saigon."

DRV MILITARY JOURNAL DISCUSSES WAR, BACKING OF SOCIALIST CAMP

On 30 July Hanoi broadcast an article from the monthly military journal QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, under the pseudonym "Quyet Thang" (determined to win), which argued that the "strategic offensive" over the past three months has "dealt a mortal blow" to Vietnamization.* As documentation, Quyet Thang asserted that 165,000 troops of the Saigon army had "disintegrated" or been "annihilated" during the offensive and that, by contrast, "the liberation main force army is standing firm on several important offensive areas and is unprecedentedly powerful."

Discounting the role of air power to turn the tide for the allies, the article observed that the concentration of air attacks in a certain area for a certain period can "to some extent increase the puppet troops'" ability to resist, but that it can "in no way change the strategic situation on the battlefield." In this connection, Quyet Thang denied allied claims that the air force has stopped the offensive and exhausted the communists, and he argued that the offensive has demonstrated the "revolutionary military viewpoint" that men are the decisive factor and that the outcome of war is determined by ground combat.

Quyet Thang in standard fashion dismissed the notion that aid for the South and international assistance can be hindered by mining DRV ports and bombing. And he also reaffirmed confidence that the Administration's "many deceitful political, diplomatic, and psywar tricks" will not isolate the revolution in the South. He declared pointedly that socialist countries consider solidarity and support for Vietnam to be both "a sacred international obligation as well as an act consistent with their

* The broadcast said that the article was published in the August issue of the journal, but it appears to have been written in early July and it is unusual for the journal to be publicized before the middle of the month. Quyet Thang's last article, published in the April issue of the journal, was broadcast on 21 May.

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people's interests."* Referring in standard indirect fashion to President Nixon's visits to China and the USSR, the article charged that Nixon "has hurriedly run across earth and heaven and used many blatantly deceitful tricks and plotted to sow dissension to bridge the gap between socialism and imperialism and between aggression and the antiaggression force and to eradicate the contradiction between the U.S. imperialists . . . and the peace-loving revolutionary people." The article denounced this "cunning but idiotic plot" and went on to strongly attack the notion that differences with the United States can be papered over:

The contradiction between socialism and imperialism is the most basic contradiction in the world today. This contradiction will forever remain a conflict stemming from the class nature of two opposing social systems that have been decisively shaped, and it will never be concealed or eradicated by any subjective scheme of the U.S. imperialists. No matter how the Nixon clique may try with its deceitful tricks, it will never be able to cover the aggressive and bellicose nature of the U.S. imperialists--number one enemy of mankind.

An article in the June QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine, only now available in translation, had also raised the question of socialist support. Repeating a charge voiced in comment earlier this year aimed at the President's trips to China and the Soviet Union, the article declared that the Nixon Doctrine attempts to "divide the socialist camp and the anti-imperialist forces" in the hope of preventing support to Vietnam. It added that the world front could not be divided and noted that the Vietnamese fight to protect "the interests of the socialist camp" as well as their own independence and freedom. In its discussion of the situation in South Vietnam the article was notable for its warning that further efforts would be needed to insure victory. It asserted, for example, that "only by making the most extensive efforts to launch resolute, continuous, vigorous, and widespread attacks against the enemy and keeping him from regaining his strength can we drive him from being violently shaken and from collapsing part by part to total collapse."

* A similar allusion to the self-interest of socialist nations supporting Vietnam was made in an article in the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN paper, broadcast by Hanoi on 5 July and discussed in the 6 July TRENDS, pages 4-5.

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PEKING MARKS TIME ON INDOCHINESE DEVELOPMENTS

Ceremonies attending the 29 July return to Peking of Cambodian Prince Sihanouk from an extensive trip to Europe and Africa occasioned a pro forma reaffirmation of Chinese support for the war effort in Indochina, but Peking has continued to mark time on the question of a settlement while awaiting developments on the negotiations front. In a speech at a banquet for Sihanouk on 30 July, Chou En-lai limited himself to generalities in pledging support for Sihanouk's "just position" on a Cambodian and Indochinese settlement and for his expressed determination to carry on the war "without compromise or retreat." Similarly, a 28 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial welcoming Sihanouk cited his "solemn and just stand" on a settlement, but neither Chou nor the editorial took the occasion to mention specific peace proposals.*

Like Chou, the editorial nourished Sihanouk's determination that no accommodation be arranged on Cambodia that would undercut his front. Chou said Sihanouk had "exposed the political schemes engineered by certain big powers," and the editorial cited his opposition to a new international conference and referred to "all sorts of political conspiracies" aimed at dividing the anti-Lon Nol forces. But while expressing support for Sihanouk on this score, the Chinese failed to mention his government's vigorous attacks on the notion of a cease-fire. Peking has avoided critical comment on this issue since President Nixon's 8 May proposal calling for an Indochina cease-fire.

Peking's cautious approach to the Indochina question was also reflected during the celebrations commemorating the 45th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army. In contrast to last year, when the Indochina struggle figured prominently both in the joint editorial and in a speech by now-purged PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng, the only mention this year was a passing reference in a 31 July speech by MAC Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying to the "great victories" won in Indochina. Last year Huang had pledged Chinese support for the war effort as well as for the PRG's seven points, the Pathet Lao's peace proposal, and Sihanouk's five-point declaration.

* The 20 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 1954 Geneva agreements anniversary endorsed the PRG's seven-point plan only in connection with its proposal for a tripartite coalition government.

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Peking has been characteristically selective in carrying Vietnamese comment on the war, deleting passages that might compromise broader PRC interests. In Peking's only reaction thus far to President Nixon's 27 July news conference in which he reiterated that it is not U.S. policy to bomb North Vietnam's dikes, NCNA's accounts of Vietnamese comment omitted the more virulent attacks on the President. Earlier, in picking up a 27 July DRV Foreign Ministry memorandum, NCNA omitted harsh charges against the President on the alleged bombing of the dikes and deleted attacks on the President's intentions in the Paris negotiations as well as a discussion of internal American political opposition to Nixon Administration policies. NCNA repeated that part of the memorandum demanding that the United States negotiate seriously on the basis of respect for the Vietnamese people's national rights "as recognized by the 1954 Geneva agreements." But while quoting the memorandum's recital of the communists' demands as embodying "the spirit" of the PRG's seven points and its elaboration of "the two key questions," NCNA deleted from the otherwise intact passage the memorandum's specification that the two key questions concern U.S. withdrawal and "political power in South Vietnam."

MOSCOW COMMENT FOCUSES ON ALLEGED BOMBING OF DRV DIKES

Routine Moscow comment continues to center on denunciations of the alleged U.S. bombing of dikes in North Vietnam and to insist that the "only" way to solve the conflict is at the Paris conference. A WPC-designated "world day of protest" against U.S. bombing of dikes and meteorological warfare, marked on 1 August, has been publicized by Moscow. Commentators repeatedly call attention to UN Secretary General Waldheim's condemnation of U.S. bombings of DRV dikes and point out that although U.S. spokesmen have tried to deny the strikes, they have been forced to "admit" that such raids have occurred unintentionally. Moscow has, however, given minimal publicity to President Nixon's 27 July press conference remarks on the bombings and the 28 July State Department report on the dike bombing issue.

TASS on the 28th carried its usual editorialized report on the President's press conference, but the only other available comment came in a 29 July foreign-language radio commentary which said his press conference shows that the United States

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intends to continue bombing dikes and dams, using "poisonous chemicals," and waging "meteorological warfare." TASS noted that the bulk of the press conference was devoted to the bombing issue, reporting that the President criticized Secretary General Waldheim as being taken in by enemy propaganda and that he asserted it is not U.S. policy to bomb dikes but to attack only military targets. TASS added, however, that the President also "admitted" that there have been reports of "incidental damage" to peripheral irrigation installations. TASS concluded by noting that President Nixon said he did not want to jeopardize negotiations, but that bombing would be continued and he did not preclude strikes at DRV irrigation structures if needed to protect U.S. pilots from antiaircraft missiles.

The only available Moscow acknowledgment of the State Department report on DRV dikes came in a 31 July English-language radio commentary which said the report "admitted" that the North Vietnamese system of dikes and dams had been damaged in 12 places although claiming that the destruction had not been deliberate. Moscow called the report a "cover statement" for the American public, charging that in fact the bombing policy had been "planned well ahead of time."

Moscow's support for the Vietnamese struggle is currently highlighted by publicity for the 27 July Paris meeting of 27 European communist and workers' parties to express solidarity with Vietnam. The Soviet delegation was headed by Politburo member Ponomarev. While the conference statement did not go beyond routine pledges of "all-round assistance" and support for the "reasonable and constructive" proposals of the DRV and PRG which offer "a fair basis" for a peaceful settlement, Moscow comment expressed satisfaction with the fact that the meeting represented a united expression of support from all the communist and workers' parties of Europe.

PHAM VAN DONG CONTINUES TO BE ABSENT FROM PUBLIC VIEW

Hanoi media marked the 25th anniversary of Wounded Soldiers and War Heroes Day on 27 July in the usual fashion with press editorials and the announcement that a delegation of leading officials had laid wreaths at a military cemetery in Hanoi and visited a military hospital.* The delegation was headed by

* Propaganda in preparation for the anniversary is discussed in the 26 July TRENDS, page 9.

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Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi and included VWP Secretary Nguyen Van Tran, Vice Chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee Tran Dang Khoa, Minister of the Interior Duong Quoc Chinh, and Deputy Defense Minister Maj. Gen. Tran Sam, as well as representatives of the Fatherland Front, the PRG, and the Hanoi Administrative Committee. Pham Van Dong has usually headed the delegation, although he failed to do so in 1971 and 1966; in those years it was led by Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh. The reason for Le Thanh Nghi's assumption of the role this year is not clear. Trinh was evidently present in Hanoi, where he attended a Cuban embassy reception on 26 July.

The absence of Premier Pham Van Dong from the anniversary delegation pointed up his failure to appear in public in recent weeks. Although he did not participate in the anniversary activities last year, he had headed the wreath-laying delegation in the four previous years. Hanoi last reported an appearance by Pham Van Dong on 10 June, when VNA indicated that he had "recently" chaired a Council of Ministers meeting. His last reported activity on a specific date was a 6 May meeting with Cuban medical volunteers, and his last appearance at a public function was at the 30 April May Day meeting. The most recent occasion on which Dong would have clearly been expected to appear but did not was during Soviet President Podgornyy's 15-18 June visit to the DRV. There have been no occasions since then which would have demanded an appearance by Dong, but his absence for this length of time is unusual. Routine messages from Pham Van Dong continue to be publicized, confirming that his failure to appear in public cannot be viewed as evidence that his official position has changed.

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CHINA

ARMY DAY EDITORIAL, RECEPTION INDICATE RETURN TO NORMALITY

For the first time since the 1 August PLA anniversary last year, the PRC has celebrated one of its major holidays in a traditional manner with a PEOPLE'S DAILY/RED FLAG/LIBERATION ARMY DAILY joint editorial and a reception. Since the cancelation of National Day activities following the purge of Lin Piao last September, Peking had sharply curtailed its anniversary observances, failing in particular to issue editorials on May Day and the 1 July party anniversary. The joint editorial on Army Day represents the third such pronouncement this year, the other two being the New Year's Day joint editorial and one on 22 May marking the 30th anniversary of Mao's Yenan Talks. In a departure from the practice of recent PLA anniversaries but consistent with Peking's behavior in recent months, the joint editorial was devoted almost wholly to domestic rather than foreign affairs.*

In both form and content, Peking's treatment of Army Day seemed designed to show that the PLA's loyalty is insured and that matters are safely in hand in the wake of the Lin affair, though Lin was not mentioned by name and no restaffing of vacant military posts was announced. The current state of affairs was reflected in a new formulation underscoring the PLA's subordination to the party by saying the army was "founded and commanded by the great leader Chairman Mao and the Communist Party of China." Previous formulations beginning during the cultural revolution did not mention the party and said Lin commanded the army.

The joint editorial pointedly cited the second plenum--a major watershed in the developments leading to Lin's purge--as the starting point from which the PLA has achieved "remarkable results" in the rectification campaign that has been taking place. In this context the editorial invoked Mao's "three

* Two of the occasions this year--May Day and the anniversary of Mao's 20 May 1970 anti-U.S. statement--on which Peking failed to produce editorials would have called for pronouncements on foreign affairs. Apart from the one for New Year's Day, the joint editorials from the time of the 1 December, 1971 editorial on strengthening party leadership have dealt mainly with domestic affairs.

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basic principles" that have figured prominently in ideological attacks on Lin's deviations. After observing that the PLA's history confirms its loyalty to the party, the editorial alluded to the recent crisis: "Any careerist or conspirator who wants to undermine this army is only daydreaming. Mountains may be shaken, but the Liberation Army--never!"

The editorial repeated a curious phrase introduced in last year's editorial on the eve of Lin's purge in saying the army "is distinguished by a remarkable unity within its ranks and with those outside them." Last year this may have been intended as a warning to Lin and his associates, and the repetition this year may be a reminder that most of the PLA did remain loyal. Referring to the army as being "under the absolute leadership of the party and an instrument for carrying out the party's program and line," this year's editorial credited the PLA with winning "splendid victories" by relying on correct principles of behavior.

The editorial did not clarify the future tasks of the army, though it took note of the PLA's cultural revolution role in the civil sector and its "contributions to the people." The editorial did not indicate that the PLA's involvement in such duties would continue; rather it stressed, in line with other pronouncements since Lin's downfall, that a "mass campaign for military training is gaining momentum."

Military Commission Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying, continuing to replace purged PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng on various occasions, delivered the speech at the defense ministry's reception on 31 July. In his brief speech Yeh associated the PLA with moves to purify the party by saying the army has worked with the people to shatter "the criminal schemes of the traitors, enemy agents, and careerists who wormed their way into the party" to usurp leadership. He declared that the army "is now more unified and more powerful than ever before." Yeh also used the occasion to voice Peking's line on growing opposition to the superpowers. Echoing Chou En-lai's 17 July remarks disparaging the Soviet-U.S. agreements on limiting strategic arms, Yeh said the two superpowers are in reality intensifying their arms expansion and their contest for world hegemony while preaching arms control and international security. Both Yeh's speech and the joint editorial contained a ritualistic vow to "liberate" Taiwan, but there was no repetition of last year's demand for the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

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LEADERSHIP TURNOUT

All of the active Peking leaders except Mao appeared at the reception in a show of stability and unity. In a ranking according priority to state titles, NCNA listed PRC Acting Chairman Tung Pi-wu and NPC Chairman Chu Te ahead of Chou, who was followed by the standard ranking of other Politburo members.* Several leaders who have been grouped with Politburo members on some recent occasions were not accorded that position, notably Hunan chief Hua Kuo-feng, who was listed among other members of the central committee. Listed among the high state officials were the three active vice ministers of national defense, reshuffled somewhat since their last appearance together on 10 July when Su Yu was ranked first. On the Army Day list the precedence was Hsiao Ching-kuang, Su, and Wang Shu-sheng.

Some reappearances particularly symbolized the return to favor of individuals whose careers suffered during the cultural revolution. Chen Yun and Li Fu-chun were listed as vice premiers in the group of state officials coming immediately after the Politburo. This represents the first public appearance since 1969 of Chen Yun, who was criticized during the cultural revolution. Another noteworthy appearance was that of Chen Tsai-tao, now listed among leading members of the PLA and previously commander of the Wuhan military region at the time of the Wuhan mutiny in mid-1967. At that time he reportedly resisted the dictates of the central authorities, imprisoning cultural revolution group member Wang Li and detaining Hsieh Fu-chih after they arrived to cope with local problems. However, there was no campaign in the media at that time against Chen, and in fact most of the cultural revolution group was soon purged for having started a campaign to "drag out the handful in the army" in the wake of the Wuhan incident. In retrospect it appears that the Wuhan incident may have been an early trial of strength between Lin and Chou rather than a mutiny against the center as such. If so, the episode prefigured the eventual linkage of Lin's fate with that of Chen Po-ta, head of the cultural revolution group.

* This represents a new ranking for leadership turnouts, though for other purposes Tung and Chu had previously been listed ahead of Chou. Chou appeared above Tung and Chu in lists of leaders appearing for the May Day celebrations and for an Albanian ballet performance on 24 June.

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MIDDLE EAST

USSR HAILS FRIENDSHIP WITH ARABS, WARNS AGAINST U.S. POLICY

References to the exodus of Soviet military personnel from Egypt have virtually disappeared in Soviet media, and the windup observances of Egypt's 20th revolution anniversary have been given only meager notice. Moscow has instead, not unexpectedly, underlined its relations with the other "progressive" Arab states, hailing economic and technical cooperation with Iraq and Syria and noting in both cases the growth of cooperation in the "political field" as well. Perhaps seeking to mute the military angle, Moscow has mentioned only once, in a brief Arabic-language report on 1 August, the presence in the USSR of the Iraqi defense minister on what was billed by the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY as a two-week visit at Grechko's invitation.* And the Soviet defense minister's customary greetings to his Syrian counterpart on Syria's 1 August army day has thus far not been reported by either side.

Moscow has played up the communique on the 21 and 25 July talks between CPSU leaders Kirilenko and Ponomarev and a Syrian Communist Party (CPS) delegation--talks which, according to Arab media, dealt with reconciliation between warring Syrian communist factions rather than with the altered Middle East political scene. The CPSU-CPS communique denounced any attempts to undermine Syrian-Soviet friendship as serving only the interests of imperialism and reaction; and threaded through other propaganda are reiterated warnings of stepped-up attempts by "imperialism" and Israel to foster Arab disunity and "drive a wedge" between the Arabs and their true friends, the socialist countries.

Along with the theme of imperialist "intrigues" come signs of an effort to counter any resurgence of U.S. influence in the Middle East in the aftermath of Cairo's action. Thus a 31 July broadcast in Arabic depicted the United States as exerting "desperate efforts to rehabilitate itself" in the eyes of the Arabs and convince them it is "prepared to do something for them" regarding a Middle East settlement. Claiming that Washington was now desirous of restoring diplomatic relations with Arab countries, the broadcast agreed with "many Arab

* Iraqi Defense Minister Shihab was in the USSR in September-October the last two years for lengthy "rest" visits; the current stay might be in return for Grechko's visit to Baghdad last December.

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personalities and the press" that there was no basis for hope of a radical change in U.S. policy toward the Arabs, which was "unthinkable." And a 1 August broadcast, also in Arabic, seized on the Iraqi foreign ministry's denial of rumors about a change in relations with the United States to assail "tendentious rumors" by "imperialist propaganda" about the "alleged peaceful role the United States could play" to bring about a solution to the Middle East crisis. It conceded that the United States did have a "key"--influence over Israel--but claimed that Tel Aviv was confident it would never be used, "either now or after the U.S. presidential elections."

While seeking to disabuse the Arabs of any notion that the United States might now reconsider its Middle East policy, Moscow has of course studiously avoided connecting speculation about changes with its setback in Egypt. It has made no attempt to exploit Egyptian President as-Sadat's charges against the United States, probably smarting from his contrasting of Soviet support for Egypt with U.S. support of Israel. An Arabic-language broadcast on the 27th, referring to Mrs. Meir's 26 July Knesset speech, wondered ingenuously why the Israeli leaders "have chosen this time to talk about peace" and concluded that Tel Aviv and its "imperialist protectors" were simply seizing every opportunity to weaken the Arabs and wring concessions from them. For listeners in Israel, a Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Hebrew the same day also professed bewilderment over why Mrs. Meir believed "congenial conditions have now been created" for direct summit contacts. It put forth the standard objection to direct talks as "tantamount to Arab surrender" under conditions of Israeli occupation of Arab territory, although it twice spoke of the "impracticality"--rather than impossibility--of the idea.

EVENTS IN EGYPT The departure of two more groups of Soviet specialists from Egypt was noted in Moscow domestic service and Arabic-language broadcasts, on the 28th and 31st respectively, reporting "warm sendoffs" by Egyptian naval personnel in Alexandria and an unspecified artillery unit. The Soviets were presented with "token presents" and thanked for their "effective and good quality" aid and "combat experience and knowledge."

Functions connected with the revolution anniversary observances were reported only briefly: Soviet media took note of the conclusion of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) National Congress session on 26 July, TASS singling out a decision on strengthening

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national unity and the internal front and a resolution terming the U.S. stand the main obstacle to a just settlement of the Middle East crisis. A short domestic service item added that the ASU also "discussed the question of strengthening friendly relations with the Soviet Union" and cited Cairo's AL-AKHBAR as calling the development of relations with the USSR "one of the main trends" of Egyptian foreign policy.

Presenting a picture of friendship as usual, TASS on 1 August reported that Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov held a reception in honor of an Egyptian parliamentary delegation leaving on a visit to the Soviet Union; it mentioned that the event was attended by ministers, ASU Central Committee members, and "executives of Egypt's foreign and war ministries" as well as by prominent public personalities. Earlier, an Arabic-language broadcast on the 27th reported Vinogradov as assuring the Egyptians, at a anniversary ceremony held at the Soviet cultural center in Cairo, that the Soviet Union would continue to stand by them and would be a "sure friend." But TASS on the 27th, briefly brushing off a launching ceremony at the Alexandria dockyard, failed to mention the presence of Vinogradov; according to Cairo radio's account, President as-Sadat "shook hands with the deputy prime ministers, the ministers, senior dockyard officials, and the Soviet ambassador."*

Moscow radio and TASS also gave short shrift to as-Sadat's 27 July speech at Alexandria University in which he remarked that "maybe," when Soviet-Egyptian cooperation "in the coming stage runs along the same line, as it did today at the shipyard, then everything will be wonderful." Moscow radio's four-sentence report dealt solely with as-Sadat's "firm rejection" of Israeli Prime Minister Meir's "hypocritical proposal" on direct Israeli-Egyptian talks. TASS' equally brief item in addition noted his description of the U.S. position on the Middle East crisis as very dangerous.

* Soviet ambassadors have been active in other major Arab capitals: Arab media have reported Mukhitdinov's meetings with the Syrian vice president and president on 22 July, the ambassador to Iraq's meeting with Saddam Husayn on the 27th to "review the good relations" between the two countries, and Ambassador Azimov's meeting with the Lebanese foreign minister on the 31st to review Arab-Soviet relations "in light of President as-Sadat's recent decisions." In Algeria the foreign ministry secretary general received "Soviet ambassador-at-large" Tsarapkin on 1 August and also received the Soviet charge d'affaires who "handed over a communication from the Soviet government concerning the evolution of the Middle East situation."

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A routine dispatch in PRAVDA on the 29th, dealing with the direct talks issue, was notable because the Cairo dateline revealed the presence there of the item's author, Igor Belyayev, a former editorial board member of PRAVDA and one of the paper's chief Middle East specialists. Belyayev is now deputy director of the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

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SOVIET DEFENSE POLICY

RED STAR LOBBIES FOR GREATER ARMS EXPENDITURES

Spokesmen for the Soviet defense establishment, while continuing to treat the Moscow summit meeting as a significant contribution to world peace, have begun to sound the alarm for increased military spending. The organ of the defense ministry, RED STAR, which in recent weeks has displayed heightened concern over the level of U.S. defense spending and the progress of new U.S. strategic weapons programs, has now resumed publication of articles championing the claims of the defense establishment for more funds. To judge from a 21 July RED STAR article, which pointedly warned would-be doves against any relaxation in Soviet military preparedness, the claims of the military have apparently been challenged by those seeking to exploit the peace dividends flowing from the detente policy.

SELECTIVE RED STAR, like other Soviet papers, duly applauded
REPORTING the results of the summit as a triumph of Soviet
diplomacy but did not participate in the carefully
orchestrated campaign launched by the media after the summit in
defense of the Soviet detente policy. This campaign, aimed at
unnamed critics of the Soviet role at the summit, was waged
exclusively by PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA among the major Moscow
newspapers. RED STAR characteristically focused attention,
through the device of selective reporting, on the continuing
threat to Soviet security posed by the United States.

For example, on 7 July RED STAR published a TASS dispatch from Washington reporting the news conference called by Secretary of Defense Laird the previous day to assail Senator McGovern's proposed cuts in U.S. defense expenditures. RED STAR quoted Laird as stating: "We are not going to plan a reduction in the military budget while the talks in the field of strategic arms are not completed." Moreover, in an unusual followup published in RED STAR on the 8th, Laird's statement on Pentagon planning was repeated but without the proviso linking the Pentagon budget to SALT. By contrast, IZVESTIYA did not report the press conference, and PRAVDA's account, published on the 8th, failed to report the statements quoted in RED STAR.

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RED STAR likewise gave greater prominence than other papers to the 11 July Kremlin reception for graduates of military academies. The event was given front-page treatment in RED STAR, alone among the major Moscow newspapers. And the summary of Defense Minister Grechko's speech at the reception published in RED STAR on the 12th reported his remark that "the most effective means of bridling aggressors is to strengthen our defensive might in every way"-a remark that did not appear in PRAVDA's abbreviated summary of the Kremlin reception.

21 JULY ARTICLE Perhaps the clearest indication of the interests and apprehensions of the Soviet defense establishment appeared in a 21 July RED STAR article authored by Col. V. Khalipov, entitled "Peaceful Coexistence and the Defense of Socialism." Significantly, the last previous unmistakably polemical article to appear in RED STAR in recent months was published under a similar rubric, "Problems of the Defense of Socialism's Achievements"; that article pointedly stressed the vital role of heavy industry in the strengthening of Soviet defense capability and was published on 17 November 1971--on the eve of the November CPSU plenum.

The Khalipov article began by noting that the policy of peaceful coexistence had led to "a significant improvement in the international climate," but it went on to stress that this eventuality was "inseparably" connected with the growing power of the USSR and its allies. "It is precisely because of the growing economic and defense might of the USSR and the fraternal socialist countries," Khalipov asserted, "that even the more powerful capitalist states are obliged increasingly to take us into account." And he maintained that a "further strengthening" of Soviet defense capability was needed in view of the "complex and contradictory" international situation.

To bolster this argument, Khalipov pointed to the "ominous" signs of opposition to detente in the United States where, in his words, "the circles of the U.S. military-industrial complex are particularly rabid." He cited estimates indicating that the Pentagon's budget would reach 100 billion dollars by 1977, and he observed that "the Pentagon is striving to build up U.S. military might in fields not restricted by the agreements signed in Moscow." The appropriation of additional funds for the Pentagon and the deployment of new weapons systems such as the Trident missile submarine and the B-1 bomber were viewed as "dangerous" developments which, in Khalipov's view, compelled

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the Soviet Union and its allies "to show tireless concern for the further strengthening of their defense capability and for the reliable defense of the peoples' revolutionary achievements."

Khalipov's case for strengthening Soviet defenses was accompanied by a sharp rebuke to unnamed domestic critics of defense spending. As he put it, "Only someone who is insufficiently mature and shortsighted politically could suppose that, as successes accrue in the affirmation of the principle of peaceful coexistence between states, it is possible to lower our vigilance and permit a slackening in our military preparedness." This rebuke, in addition to suggesting high-level differences over foreign policy, indicates that the perennial debate over the military budget is now in full swing.

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SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS

BLOC LEADERS DISCUSS "PRESSING ISSUES" AT CRIMEA MEETING

Moscow's efforts to increase intra-bloc coordination on foreign policy issues during a period of fluidity in East-West relations and in the wake of the recent developments in the Middle East seemed evident in the informal meeting of Soviet bloc first secretaries in the Crimea on 31 July, announced by TASS on the same day. Where Romania's Ceausescu was notably absent from the last such informal Crimean gathering in August 1971--a period when Moscow seemed intent on isolating the Romanian mavericks because of their relations with Peking--he took part in the latest display of Soviet bloc unity during a calmer period in Soviet-Romanian relations. Ceausescu had last conferred with the other top leaders at the meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee in Prague in January of this year. In the wake of the NATO ministerial meeting in May and the Moscow summit, it was widely rumored that the Political Consultative Committee would convene again in June, but that meeting did not materialize.

The TASS account of the latest gathering was generally uninformative, stating merely that the party chiefs, while on "a brief rest" in the Crimea, "had a fruitful exchange of opinions on the progress of the building of socialism and communism and on the further development of all-round cooperation among the socialist states." It added tersely that "pressing international issues were also discussed." Unlike the lengthy TASS account of the 1971 Crimea meeting which, without Ceausescu, had set forth the participants' coordinated positions on European problems, the Middle East, and Indochina, the report on the present session made no reference to specific foreign policy questions, thereby obviating the need to present compromise formulations on any issues in dispute. With Finland on record with its proposal to open multilateral preparations for a European security conference on 22 November and with the FRG-GDR talks slated to reopen on 2 August, it may be assumed that European problems were a major topic of discussion.

In addition to Brezhnev and Podgornyy, according to Radio Moscow, the Soviet delegation included, among others, Katushev, secretary in charge of relations with ruling communist parties, and Foreign Minister Gromyko. TASS reported on 1 August that Brezhnev and Ceausescu met that day and "exchanged views" on developing bilateral party and state ties as well as on "other matters of mutual interest." It added that the talks were held in "a friendly atmosphere."

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HUNGARIAN OFFICIAL ATTACKS CHINESE, NATIONALIST DEVIATIONS

A Hungarian party official who played a central role in the preparations for the 1969 Moscow international communist conference has acted as Moscow's spokesman in calling for cohesion in the Soviet bloc during a period of detente and active Chinese diplomatic moves. In an article in the August issue of the Soviet journal RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYI MIR, reprinted in the July-August issue of Budapest's TARSADALMI SZEMLE, Z. Komocsin has used the third anniversary of the international conference to put in an elaborate plea for unity in the face of Peking's "anti-Soviet platform" and the dangers of nationalism in the communist movement. Moscow's most authoritative comment on the anniversary, an 8 June PRAVDA editorial article coming close on the heels of President Nixon's visit, had made only a passing swipe at the Chinese while combining a sharp attack on nationalism with a defense of Moscow's summitry.

Komocsin makes it clear that Peking's resurgent role in international affairs poses serious difficulties for Moscow. While some may have hoped that the Chinese would alter their divisive policies following their seating in the United Nations, Komocsin says, "time, unfortunately, has not justified these hopes." Maintaining that rather than closing ranks with the socialist countries Peking is giving "priority" to developing relations with the United States, he charges that the Chinese are "causing serious damage to the anti-imperialist movement in connection with every significant concrete problem and thus are playing objectively into the hands of the imperialists." In this connection, he observes that "not even the most elementary cooperation has been achieved on the fundamental questions such as support for the Indochina peoples."

Concern over nationalist tendencies in the Soviet sphere is reflected in pointed passages taking to task those in the communist ranks who "overestimate national peculiarities" and indulge in a mystique about the sovereignty of states and parties. In passages challenging views held by the Romanians and other independent-minded parties that are loath to subordinate their interests to those of proletarian internationalism, Komocsin argues that those who follow the road of "sovereignty with nationalist content are losing sight of class goals and are following the road of abandoning internationalism." Apparently with the maverick Romanians chiefly in mind, he goes on to deride attempts by those who

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talk of equal rights while at the same time telling others what to say and interpret every word to them as "a violation of the sovereignty of their party."

Implicitly indicating that Hungary itself may have been the recipient of fraternal counsel, Komocsin states: "We Hungarian communists do not regard a comradely exchange of views or frank criticism connected with our own problems to be intervention in our internal affairs." In another passage that could have relevance to Hungary's relations with the Soviet bloc, Komocsin acknowledges that "frictions" may arise over the conflict of national and international interests. Although he tries to minimize such differences by declaring that they are "only at the level of the short range" and not "in the historical sense," his observation is more candid than the standard line promulgated at the Moscow conference that national and international interests are organically combined and hence cannot be in conflict. His main point, however, is quite orthodox, insisting that "it is always the task to put correctly interpreted national interests on the higher strategic level"--that is, to subordinate national interests to "class" positions as interpreted by the Soviet Union. Driving the point home, he asserts: "It is historically proven fact that an effective harmonization of differing national interests can be realized only by recognizing the priority of common international interests."

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COMMUNIST PARTY RELATIONS

WESTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES PUBLICLY CENSURE CZECH TRIALS

The political trials in Czechoslovakia have drawn public criticism from West European communist parties, with the large French and Italian CP's betraying concern lest they share in the opprobrium attached to the trials by their domestic constituencies and their electoral prospects suffer as a result.

With an eye to the coming French parliamentary elections, the French Communist Party (PCF) issued a statement on 28 July publicly criticizing the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCZ) for putting on trial people charged with political offenses that are not "truly subversive." The statement came on the heels of public condemnations of the trials by other leftist political parties in France, including a reported telegram to Czechoslovak President Svoboda from French Socialist Party (PS) leader Mitterand deploring the disregard of civil liberties. The PCF thus displayed its apprehensiveness about the impact the trials could have on the credibility of its pledges of concern for individual liberties in the recently publicized PCF-PS joint government program.

The PCF statement treads a careful line between recognition of the political context in which the party functions in France and deference to the party's role in the Soviet-led communist movement. It sought repeatedly to assure the French people that the PCF upholds the principles of freedom of thought and expression and that these principles would be scrupulously observed if a PCF-PS coalition government came to power in France. At the same time, it balanced its criticism of the CPCZ with the assertion that the French party would never allow itself to denounce "as a whole" the actions taken by the Czechoslovak party in the interests of the working class and would continue to struggle against campaigns waged by "reaction" against the communist countries.

The Italian Communist Party and the Communist Party of Great Britain have also reacted publicly to the trials. The Italian CP organ published articles reaffirming the party's position, without explicitly restating it, on the "events" of 1968 in Czechoslovakia and expressing "concern" over the current trials.

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The British party, in the words of Assistant Secretary Falber as published in MORNING STAR on 28 July, said that if the reports on the nature of the charges are true, "the proceedings and sentences are greatly to be deplored." Falber noted that there "is an absence of adequate official information" on the trials, adding that according to the published reports "most of the defendants appear to have been accused of producing and distributing leaflets on the people's rights in last autumn's elections."

CPCZ RATIONALE FOR THE TRIALS The Czechoslovak party's justification for the trials was set forth in an article in the party organ RUDE PRAVO on 18 July, the day after the official news service CTK announced the opening of proceedings against six people accused of "distributing illegal printed matter" at the time of the 1971 fall elections and of "subversive activity against the Czechoslovak Republic." Entitled "Without Indulgence," the article, by Jiri Hecko, maintained that "hostile activity aimed against our socialist society, its socialist system and its leading force, the CPCZ," is a "serious criminal activity" that could have "dangerous consequences" if society were to "indulge" it and allow it to "grow into large dimensions." While "a number of rightwing representatives" left Czechoslovakia in 1968-69, the article said, "a number of defeated rightwing representatives have also remained in Czechoslovakia and are continuing to carry out activities aimed against the basic principles on which we are building our socialist society." Hecko went on to list activities which he categorized as sharply conflicting, by their "content and form," with socialist law:

printing and mimeographing of leaflets containing slanderous lies about our party-state organs as well as about our closest allies; various printed matter aimed at inciting our citizens to sabotage . . . ; instigation to reverse our present system, even with the use of violence and arms . . . ; efforts to maintain permanent contact with traitors who left their country or for the passing of information to these traitors . . . ; attempts to form various groupings of persons conducting activities intentionally hostile to our system.

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Acknowledging that "leading party-state representatives have declared on many occasions that no one in Czechoslovakia will be persecuted for his political views or convictions," the article contended that this does not mean anyone will be permitted "to destroy with impunity, by punishable activity, all that entire generations of the best members of our nations have fought and died for." Reflecting the list of charges in the RUDE PRAVO article, the few terse reports on the trials that have been carried in Czechoslovak media have repeatedly stated that the defendants were being tried for "hostile" and "subversive" activities against the "socialist state," including the preparation and disseminating of "antistate" pamphlets.

First Secretary Husak, who has in the past promised that there would be no show trials violating individual liberties, has been sitting out the trials on vacation in the USSR since 15 July. But hardlining CPCZ Presidium member Bilak, in a 28 July CTK interview on his return to Prague from the preceding day's Paris conference of European communist parties on Vietnam, commented directly on the Western press reports which he said expressed indignation over the trials of "disruptionist" elements in Czechoslovakia rather than directing their indignation against "the atrocities in Vietnam or the shooting of children in Ireland." Bilak charged the "imperialists" with trying to divert attention from their own "crimes against humanity."

Bilak seemed to display pique over the West European parties' criticisms when he observed pointedly that "it is the task of the fraternal parties to mobilize the whole world public, especially in Europe, to condemn the crimes" in Vietnam and Ireland. The subject of the trials had apparently come up in Bilak's talks with the French communists; the PCF statement, released the day Bilak left Paris, noted that the French party had been in contact with the CPCZ to ascertain the facts about the trials.

Themes similar to those played by Bilak in the CTK interview were emphasized in RUDE PRAVO comment the next day and in Prague international broadcasts on 1 August defending the trials against the "campaign" of criticism in the Western press. RUDE PRAVO proclaimed on the 29th that the party is now in a position to "rap on the knuckles" people who "do not heed warnings" and "want to make fire."

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The sole monitored mention of the trials in Soviet central media was a brief TASS report in the 28 July PRAVDA citing CTK on the conclusion of the proceedings against Dr. Silhan and others in Brno who were sentenced for "active hostile activity aimed at overthrowing the socialist state system." East Berlin media, however, have chimed in with vigorous defense of the trials and of the Czechoslovaks' right to defend their state in accordance with "socialist legality."

FRENCH CP STATEMENT The PCF statement, dated the 28th and published in the party organ L'HUMANITE the next day, noted that the French party Politburo had met on 25 July to study the situation surrounding the "political trials" in Czechoslovakia and decided to "make representations" on the subject to the CPCZ. It recalled that in February, when Western sources were reporting numerous arrests of Czechoslovak dissidents, the PCF had held talks with CPCZ leaders including Husak and had received a promise that there would be "no trial or arrest for reasons connected with people's opinions" and that "socialist legality" would be scrupulously respected.

Underscoring the PCF's concern for human rights in the communist-ruled countries as well as in the West, the statement said the French party had taken note of Husak's February promise and had issued a declaration on 18 February recounting the results of the PCF-CPCZ consultations. That declaration had quoted Husak as assuring PCF Politburo member Leroy that "the time of contrived and prefabricated trials is definitely over," that "an illegal conspiratory network" had been investigated but that most of the people "summoned and questioned" had been freed. The declaration registered something less than full satisfaction with these assurances, stating cryptically that "the PCF will continue to maintain, under any circumstances, its consistent positions regarding its stand" toward the fraternal parties.

The 28 July statement now publicized details of arrests and trials said to be based on information received from the CPCZ, specifying that some 70 people had been questioned and half of them released. It said legal proceedings had been started against 32 people, "some" of whom had since been acquitted while "others" were sentenced. It asserted that 11 people are soon to be tried "for 'activities hostile' to socialism." In ensuing convoluted passages, placing the party on record as recognizing the need for actions to defend socialism against "maneuvers of the class enemy," while at the same time

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disclaiming PCF support for any violation of individual liberties, the statement said:

Whenever forces hostile to socialism, either in or outside a country, indulge in truly subversive activities, whenever they resort to violence or sabotage, it is both just and necessary that they be dealt with by all the strictness of the law. The new regime has the duty to protect the achievements of the workers against such maneuvers of the class enemy It appears from the information we possess that the trials now in progress in Czechoslovakia are not directed against activities of that kind. When it comes to political and ideological opposition, we believe that to defeat and isolate the enemies of socialism it is necessary to resort to an intensive political and ideological struggle

Citing party documents and the French Communist-Socialist joint government program, the statement stressed that if the PCF should enter the French Government, minority rights will be respected and "the working class will always choose noncoercive methods of struggle, persuasion, and education"; however, the statement continued, "it would not hesitate to resort to coercion if forces hostile to socialism resort to subversion and violence." The party pledged in conclusion that it would continue to fight campaigns in the West which "grossly" misrepresent reality in the communist countries.

ITALIAN CP COMMENT Reasserting the stronger and less equivocal position of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) on events in Czechoslovakia, an unsigned article in the party organ L'UNITA on 22 July said the PCI position "on the entire Czechoslovak affair is well known and was confirmed at the 13th congress" in March. Maintaining that the PCI has always stressed its "desire not to interfere in the domestic affairs of the socialist countries and communist parties," the article went on to say, however, that "it is obvious in our opinion that the trials which have taken place in Prague do not concern solely internal affairs but raise questions and problems which we must also answer." Alleging that "little is known" about the trials "because there was no real public attendance," a circumstance which is "detrimental to those who would like to form a considered and careful opinion" and which "casts a dark shadow on the

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procedure," the article asserted that "there should be no fear of publicity concerning crimes which are obvious or considered to be so."

In harsher terms, the article said that "to arrive at trials and sentences in connection with the facts as they have been officially announced is certainly a cause for political concern." L'UNITA argued that "antistate" and "slandorous" publications should be countered not by trials but with "an argued defense and public polemic, with an ideological and political counter-attack, and with a campaign where truth and possible slanders are confronted." It lectured that "resorting to administrative and judicial methods does not solve matters but aggravates them"--a passage which underscores the PCI's concern, like the PCF's, to dissociate itself from positions that could hurt its chances with the national electorate.

A second unsigned L'UNITA article, on 24 July, vigorously defended the PCI position on the trials in rebutting criticism of the PCI by other Italian parties, including the dissident Il Manifesto communist group. Rejecting charges by the latter group, L'UNITA noted that the recent PCI congress had confirmed the party's stand on the August 1968 "events" and had manifested "great" support for the independent-minded Spanish Communist Party, which has been at odds with the CPSU since the 1968 invasion. The article emphasized that the PCI has expressed and will "continue to express our criticism also with regard to those whom we consider friends, and we do so always inspired by our principles and by our policy"--a policy which follows an "autonomous" path.

On the 29th L'UNITA published a dispatch from Paris summarizing the French party's statement, including the wrapup of information received by the PCF from the CPCZ and the PCF's criticism of the Czechoslovaks. At this writing, the PCI has offered no comment on the validity or completeness of this "information."

MOSCOW WELCOMES COMMUNIST-SOCIALIST COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Moscow media in recent weeks have hailed growing signs of cooperation between the communist and socialist parties of Western Europe as a "realistic" means of overcoming "conservative" opposition and enhancing the prospects for a communist role in West European governments. Attention has focused on

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the 12th congress of the Socialist International held in Vienna on 26-29 June, the 26 June agreement by the French Communist and Socialist parties on a joint government program, and the 16 July decision by the majority of the small, leftwing Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP) to join the Italian Communist Party.*

UNITY MOVES Moscow radio commentator Levin on 18 July, for example, described the joint program worked out by the French Communist and Socialist parties as a document that "reflects the trend of joint action on the part of leftwing forces--the trend for cooperation which has always been supported by the communists." He stressed that the PSIUP's decision to join the PCI "increases the influence and importance of the political life not only of the PCI but also of the communist parties of other countries," citing the activities of the French CP and of the small West German Communist Party (DKP).

The negotiations between the French Communist and Socialist parties leading up to the final agreement and the formal approval of the agreement at national conferences of the two parties on 9 July were reported by Moscow media in considerable detail. TASS repeatedly cited remarks made by French CP Deputy General Secretary Marchais to the effect that the agreement "is an unprecedented event" in the French workers movement and that the party is ready to develop cooperation with "all left, democratic forces of France." A NEW TIMES commentary on 7 July noted that the present agreement goes beyond the 1936 Popular Front and the alliances of the immediate postwar years when communists and socialists were represented in the government. The magazine observed that "all democratic organizations and trade unions" support the agreement and called this fact "important" in view of the forthcoming parliamentary elections.**

* The PSIUP's decision to join the PCI, made at its fourth and apparently final congress in Rome 13-16 July, was approved by 67 percent of the party's members; eight percent voted to join the Italian Socialist Party, from which a small group of leftwing members had defected in 1964 to form the PSIUP; and the remaining members decided to stay in a rump PSIUP.

** A 30 June French Central Committee resolution announced the decision to hold the 20th Congress of the French CP 13-17 December 1972 in Saint-Ouen.

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Reviewing the French Communist-Socialist agreement from an Italian perspective, an article in the Italian CP theoretical journal RINASCITA of 7 July stated bluntly that the "initiation of unity talks" among the leaders of the Italian communist, socialist, and Catholic political forces for the purpose of drafting a government program similar to the French one "is of course not possible." While ruling out such an agreement, the author asserted that "what is necessary, and unavoidable, is the initiation of an effort to find and to define common directions leading to a solution of the principal problems of the workers and of the nation."

VIENNA CONGRESS OF
SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL

The 12th congress in Vienna of the Socialist International, consisting predominantly of leaders and representatives of European social democratic and socialist parties, also prompted a rather favorable response in IZVESTIYA on 20 July. The author of the IZVESTIYA article, A. Bovin, was previously associated with the CPSU Central Committee apparatus, but since the period of Tito's visit to the Soviet Union in June he has been identified as a political commentator for IZVESTIYA. While noting areas of continued disagreement between the communists and social democrats and the existence of differences between individual social democratic parties, Bovin's article repeatedly referred to the "positive aspects" of the Socialist International movement. Bovin's conclusion was that the congress "showed that the trend toward pursuing a realistic and constructive line on foreign policy questions is continuing to become stronger in social democratic circles."

Other Moscow comment on the congress also stressed that cooperation between the parties of the Socialist International and communist parties was developing with a "greater force than ever before," citing the comments of French Socialist leader Mitterand and Finnish Social Democratic Party delegate (and Foreign Minister) Sorsa on cooperation with the communist parties in their respective countries.

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CUBA - U S S R

CASTRO RATIONALIZES CUBAN DEPENDENCE ON USSR

Pervading Fidel Castro's 26 July address was a defensive insistence that Cuba's status as a client member of the Soviet "socialist camp," dictated by economic realities, redounds to Cuba's benefit and in no way vitiates Cuba's independence, integrity, or aspirations to tutelage of an eventual Latin American community of socialist states. Coming on the heels of his talks in Moscow and East European capitals and Cuba's admission to the Soviet bloc's economic organization, Castro's speech again underscored Havana's increasing reliance on Moscow at the expense of its once militant line on Latin American revolution as a means of resisting U.S. influence in the hemisphere.

Castro used the occasion of his annual address on the anniversary of the assault on the Moncada Barracks to sum up for mass public consumption the results of his nine-week tour of 10 African and European countries, capped by a 26 June-5 July sojourn in the USSR which Moscow clearly viewed as a success. The Soviet leaders' congratulatory message to Castro and Dorticos on the 26 July anniversary called the consultations with Castro in Moscow "a new important stage in broadening and consolidating" Soviet-Cuban relations and described those relations as "becoming closer, more varied, and richer in all fields of socialist and communist construction."* Castro referred in his speech to a detailed, closed-door briefing on the trip which he had delivered at an enlarged meeting of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) Central Committee in three sessions lasting 22 hours from 15 through 17 July. Havana media had reported that the briefing took place but publicized none of the substance of Castro's report, noting only that it was approved unanimously.

* The Soviet message on last year's anniversary had noted, more briefly, that bilateral friendship and cooperation was becoming "increasingly active and multilateral." This year's greeting is distinguished by the portrayal of a qualitative step forward as a result of the visit, presumably alluding to Cuba's admission to CEMA.

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On 20 July a PCC Central Committee resolution on Castro's trip report implicitly registered continuing qualms and concerns about Soviet summitry and its implications for small, dependent communist countries--immediately Vietnam and ultimately Cuba itself. Most notably, the resolution took note of an "important" statement by Castro to the effect that successful revolution requires that anti-imperialist struggle be based on "full awareness that imperialism's apparent cooperation with any truly revolutionary process is deceptive and false in the long run." Elsewhere the document cited U.S. actions in Vietnam as "a demonstration of the hypocrisy of the assertions made by the U.S. President when he said he was prepared to cooperate in working for peace in the world."

At the 26 July rally, with the PRG's Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh on the podium, Castro conveyed his view of Cuba's stake in the Indochina conflict, arguing that "when the war in Vietnam ends with the imperialists' defeat" it will "not be so easy to plan wars against Cuba." Again truculently discounting the idea that Cuba would welcome an overture from the United States and insisting that it is not up to Washington to call the shots ("U.S. relations with Cuba will not take place whenever President Nixon wants them"), he in effect excluded Cuba from the trend of detente promoted by the President's summitry: "There will be no political deals made with the Cuban revolution. No one can play with the Cuban revolution . . . Cuba's doors have been completely closed to the politicking and trickery of Mr. Nixon."

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Castro devoted a major part of his speech to what amounted to a rationalization of Cuba's submission to tighter Soviet economic control through the machinery of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), to which Cuba was admitted at a CEMA Council session shortly after the end of Castro's tour. Castro's sensitivity on the subject was reflected in his failure to specifically mention CEMA in the course of a lengthy, elaborate discourse on the necessity of socialist economic coordination. He had said nothing about CEMA in his publicized speeches in Eastern Europe and the USSR, where the details of the move to bring Cuba into the economic alliance were apparently worked out. The CEMA Council's admission of Cuba did not occasion commentaries hailing the event in Havana media, nor was it mentioned in the Central Committee resolution. Castro, dealing with the subject indirectly in the 26 July speech, expatiated on "the enormous importance attached by all socialist countries

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to international cooperation," especially in the economic sphere, and on the "extraordinary and generous" economic aid provided by the Soviet Union.

"Economic relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union have been the most generous and most revolutionary that could exist between two countries," Castro assured his audience. He took note of all the "free weapons" the Soviets had sent to Cuba and recalled the credits and materials they had provided to help Cuba over "difficult years." Polemically, he told the "pseudorevolutionaries, the intriguers and slanderers" that Cuba owed its security to "the support of the socialist bloc and the Soviet Union . . . , the weapons of the socialist bloc and the Soviet Union." The charge he was particularly at pains to rebut was the "ridiculous claim," traced to "imperialism," that Cuba is therefore "a satellite of the Soviet Union."

Castro also sought to debunk the notion that integration with the socialist bloc today "will have to conflict with" ultimate integration of Cuba's economy with those of other Latin American countries--a process that must await "the inexorable hour of the revolution" in the hemisphere and may take "10, 15, 20, 25, 30 years." Meanwhile, he argued, in a notably elaborate rejection of any economic trafficking with the United States or U.S.-dominated economies, Cuba was not going to "integrate with the United Fruit Company, the Standard Oil Company, ITT," or the other "monopolistic octopuses." Cuba, "a small country surrounded by capitalists, blockaded by the Yankee imperialists," had no alternative but to integrate with the Soviet bloc.

RELATIONS WITH U.S. In rejecting improved relations with the United States in present circumstances, Castro indulged in a redundant discourse on Cuba's ability to get along without any help from the United States: "No advantage of any type, no economic advantage could tempt us," and "no economic benefit could compensate morally for what Yankee tourism would mean in this country." And again: "No economic advantage in any sense could tempt our country. Cuba's development in all fields is assured without any relations with the United States."

In the vein of his May Day speech, in which he had said Cuba "will wait quietly until one day when realistic men rule" the United States, he looked forward now to "the possibility that some time" a "realistic" government would come to power in

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Washington that would respect Cuba's "interests, sovereignty, and rights." In this context, he greeted "with satisfaction those advances and new formulations being made in U.S. politics," noting that "it is even said that one of the candidates favors ending the blockade against Cuba." But he went on to complain that "they include in a platform that Cuba cannot become a military base"--alluding to the passage in the Democratic Party platform calling for "recognition that while Cuba must not be permitted to become a foreign military base, after 13 years of boycott, crisis and hostility, the time has come to re-examine our relations with Cuba and to seek a way to resolve this cold war confrontation on mutually acceptable terms." Singling out only the stipulation that Cuba must not be allowed to become a military base and ignoring the rest of the passage, Castro commented that "no party platform has the right to establish conditions here of any sort."

The Democrats nevertheless emerged in Castro's portrayal as the lesser evil. "We believe," he said, ". . . that the Republican Party, Nixon's party, has the worst position and is the most criminal, the most reactionary, and the most warmongering."

LATIN AMERICA Castro's appraisal of developments in Latin America followed standard lines, with Peru, Chile, and Panama singled out as harbingers of revolutionary change. In the wake of Peru's reestablishment of diplomatic ties with Cuba, Castro gave pride of place to Peru and observed that "conclusive proof of Peru's confirmation of its sovereignty has been its attitude toward Cuba." He paid briefer but typically warm tribute to Allende as "our comrade and great friend of our revolution."

Once again rejecting the idea of Cuba rejoining the OAS, he acknowledged the Peruvian and Chilean view that the organization should exist and granted that "the day might come when the anti-imperialists become a majority" in the OAS. These remarks prefaced a reference to Panama as a country where "anti-imperialism" is gaining ground in the "just struggle for liberation of the Canal Zone." Castro has regularly singled out Chile, Peru, and Panama in recent speeches. Panama was unmentioned in the joint communique winding up Castro's trip to the USSR, in the wake of the U.S.-Soviet summit, but was duly included along with Chile and Peru in some of the communiqués Castro signed in Eastern Europe.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

ELECTION OF UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT REFLECTS CONTINUED STALEMATE

The 28 July election of I.S. Grushetskiy as Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman--the No. 3 post in the Ukraine--suggests continuing disagreement among Ukrainian leaders, who by naming Grushetskiy appear to be deferring a more basic redistribution of power in the wake of Shelest's removal. Initially, when A.P. Lyashko left the post of Presidium chairman to become premier at the 9 June Ukrainian Supreme Soviet session, the Ukrainian Politburo was unable to agree on a successor and the decision was postponed until the next Supreme Soviet session, now held almost two months later. In selecting Grushetskiy, the leaders passed over all the full Politburo members to pick the oldest and least influential member of the hierarchy, apparently as a compromise.

At 68, Ukrainian party commission chairman Grushetskiy is the oldest member of the leadership and has been treated as the least important. Although his tenure in the Politburo was exceeded only by that of First Secretary V.V. Shcherbitskiy and First Deputy Premier M.T. Kalchenko, Grushetskiy was only a candidate member and was normally ranked last even among candidate members, suggesting that he was in disfavor with former First Secretary Shelest. He was promoted to full Politburo member at a Ukrainian Central Committee plenum held one day before his election as Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman. Grushetskiy, as one of Khrushchev's oldest and closest proteges in the Ukrainian Politburo, fell into eclipse after Khrushchev's fall and was dropped as Central Committee secretary and shunted into the sinecure of Ukrainian party commission chairman in December 1965. Although serving briefly in Dnepropetrovsk, as obkom secretary with Brezhnev during 1939, Grushetskiy has spent almost his entire career in the west Ukraine and has had no other visible tie to the Dnepropetrovsk or other factions.

PROMOTION OF
LYASHKO PROTEGE

Although the factional implications of Grushetskiy's selection are unclear, the 27 July Ukrainian Central Committee plenum's other main personnel action is clearly a victory for Premier Lyashko. Kiev Oblast First Secretary V.M. Tsybulko--Lyashko's assistant for cadres while Lyashko was first secretary of Donetsk obkom and later Ukrainian second secretary--was elected a candidate member of the Politburo. Tsybulko had been transferred to the Kiev post and removed as Ukrainian cadre section head in 1970, after Lyashko was

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removed as second secretary and kicked upstairs to Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman, presumably on Shelest's initiative. Although the Kiev first secretary has always been elected a Politburo candidate member in recent years, Tsybulko was not so honored at the March 1971 Ukrainian party congress, apparently because of opposition by Shelest, who sharply criticized his obkom's work in early 1971.

With Tsybulko's promotion the Donetsk faction under Lyashko continues to gain in power, despite Brezhnev's links with Shcherbitskiy and the Dnepropetrovsk faction. Of the 14 members and candidate members of the Politburo, five formerly worked under Lyashko in Donetsk: Central Committee Secretaries A.A. Titarenko and Ya. P. Pogrebnyak, Donetsk First Secretary V.I. Degtyarev, trade union chairman V.A. Sologub, and Tsybulko. The Donetsk organization, the largest in the Ukraine, has long been markedly underrepresented in the Ukrainian leadership but is now more influential than at any time since its former leader L.G. Melnikov served as Ukrainian first secretary 1949-53. First Secretary Shcherbitskiy consequently may face difficulties in gaining support in the Politburo, since he apparently can count only on two votes out of the nine--his own and Dnepropetrovsk First Secretary A.F. Vatchenko's--against three Donetsk full members, perhaps joined by his old Kharkov rival First Deputy Premier G.I. Vashchenko and Second Secretary I.K. Lutak, an apparent Shelest ally.

REMOVAL OF CADRE CHIEF Another personnel action, taken two days before the Ukrainian Central Committee plenum, also appears to be a setback for Shcherbitskiy, who loses his prime agent in the cadre field. Ukrainian Central Committee cadre section head A.A. Ulanov was elected a secretary of the Voroshilovgrad obkom at a 25 July obkom plenum. As Dnepropetrovsk city first secretary 1966-70, Ulanov was a close protege of Dnepropetrovsk Oblast First Secretary Vatchenko and presumably of Shcherbitskiy as well. While another Shcherbitskiy man may succeed Ulanov, it will be difficult to find anyone with closer ties to the Dnepropetrovsk group. Further, Ulanov's removal is clearly a demotion, since his predecessor, Tsybulko, became first secretary of Kiev oblast when removed in 1970, while Ulanov now occupies a less important post.

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GEORGIAN POLICE CHIEF TAKES OVER CORRUPTION-RIDDEN TBILISI

Recent exposures of crime and corruption in Georgia have led to the election on 25 July of Georgian MVD chief E.A. Shevardnadze to the post of Tbilisi city party committee first secretary and to Georgian First Secretary V.P. Mzhavanadze's sacrifice of two of his closest proteges, Tbilisi leader O.I. Lolashvili and Central Committee Secretary for Industry N. Sh. Tskhakaya. The highly unusual selection of a police official to head an important party organization is reminiscent of the appointment in 1969 of Azerbaydzhan KGB chief G.A. Aliyev as republic party boss after exposure of widespread corruption in Azerbaydzhan. However, in Georgia the young MVD chief Shevardnadze, who served as Komsomol first secretary in 1957-61, appears more suited to the task of executing a crackdown than old KGB chief A.N. Inauri, who assumed his post nearly two decades ago along with Mzhavanadze.

Shevardnadze's predecessor Lolashvili was censured by the CPSU Central Committee in March, but his removal appeared unlikely in view of Mzhavanadze's repeated expressions of confidence that Lolashvili and the Tbilisi party organization would correct the shortcomings. The current Georgian difficulties apparently began when Tbilisi First Secretary Lolashvili was called to report to the CPSU Central Committee and a Central Committee decree on the Tbilisi organization's work was published in PRAVDA on 6 March criticizing a wide range of shortcomings, including corruption, poor choice of cadres, and ideological and nationalistic deviations. A 14 March Tbilisi gorkom plenum heard Lolashvili demand improvement of cadre work and admit that "criminals" had "turned up as leaders of industrial enterprises and heads of stores." (An April issue of AGITATOR indicated that 1.7 million rubles had been stolen at just one Tbilisi factory alone.) Mzhavanadze spoke at the plenum and, while urging tough measures, pronounced the Tbilisi party organization "healthy" and "capable of coping with any difficulties" (PRAVDA, 17 March). At a Georgian Central Committee plenum in early April Mzhavanadze again reassured his protege: "Now we may again say with confidence that the Tbilisi party organization is healthy . . . and capable of coping with any difficulties" And he praised the speeches of Lolashvili and other city leaders for showing that they correctly understood how to correct the shortcomings (ZARYA VOSTOKA, 4 April).

Despite Mzhavanadze's statements, harsher action was initiated two months later. A 5 June Georgian Central Committee plenum

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exposed "errors" in the work of Central Committee Secretary N. Sh. Tskhakaya, and he was expelled from the leadership. Tskhakaya had been in charge of industry and hence presumably was held responsible for the scandals in industrial plants. He was a close protege of Mzhavanadze, who at a June 1967 Georgian plenum had devoted special praise to him while he was serving as a secretary at a Tbilisi plant; Mzhavanadze elevated him to Tbilisi city secretary in November 1969 and to Georgian Central Committee secretary in April 1970. Tskhakaya was replaced by Z.A. Pataridze, an obscure local secretary from Chiatura city who was not even a Georgian Central Committee member or candidate member.

The plenum also replaced the head of the Central Committee's trade, planning, and financial organs section, placing this scandal-ridden realm under I.A. Shevardnadze, who presumably is MVD chief E.A. Shevardnadze's brother (they have the same patronymic, and I.A. was released as Tbilisi second secretary shortly before E.A. became city first secretary, apparently to avoid the charge of nepotism).

Two new Tbilisi secretaries were elected at a late-May city plenum, and at a 25 July city plenum Shevardnadze replaced Lolashvili as first secretary. On the same day Lolashvili was demoted to Georgian building materials minister, and on 28 July a Georgian Central Committee plenum removed him from the Georgian bureau. Lolashvili's career had marked him as a trusted Mzhavanadze protege: Selected to head the Georgian Central Committee's administrative organs section in 1962, he soon became second secretary, then first secretary of the Georgian capital.

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